A major algorithmic challenge in designing applications intended for secure remote execution is ensuring that they are oblivious to their inputs, in the sense that their memory access patterns do not leak sensitive information to the server. This problem is particularly relevant to cloud databases that wish to allow queries over the client's encrypted data. One of the major obstacles to such a goal is the join operator, which is non-trivial to implement obliviously without resorting to generic but inefficient solutions like Oblivious RAM (ORAM).
INTRODUCTION
With an increasing reliance on cloud-based services to store large amounts of user data securely, there is also a growing demand for such services to provide remote computation in a privacy-preserving manner. This is a vital requirement for cloud databases that store sensitive records and yet wish to support queries on such data.
Various different mechanisms exist that achieve this purpose, for instance, dedicated hardware in the form of secure cryptographic coprocessors or hardware enclaves like Intel SGX [10] that come in the form of a dedicated set of processor instructions. Although such approaches provide good cryptographic guarantees in that they ensure the contents of the user's data remain encrypted throughout the execution of a remote program, on their own they provide no guarantees to address a major source of information leakage: the memory access patterns of the execution. As the program reads and writes to specific addresses of the untrusted server's memory, these access patterns can reveal information to the server about the user's data if the program's control flow is dependent on its input.
Consider, for example, the standard O(n log n) sort-merge algorithm for database joins. The two input tables are first sorted by their join attributes and then scanned for matching entries by keeping track of a pointer at each table. At each step either one of the pointers is advanced (if one of either corresponding join attributes precedes the other), or an entry is appended to the output. If the tables are stored on regular memory, an adversary observing memory patterns will obtain input-dependent information at each step. Namely, at each step it will learn the locations of the two entries read from the input table, and depending on whether an entry is written to output, it will learn whether the entries match. This information can reveal critical information about the user's input.
Protecting a program against such leaks amounts to making it oblivious: that is ensuring that its decisions about which memory locations to access do not depend on the actual contents of its input data. For many programs this is difficult to accomplish without introducing substantial computational overhead [41] . The generic approach is to use an Oblivious RAM (ORAM), which provides an interface through which a program can access memory non-obliviously, while at the same time providing guarantees that the actual physical accesses of such programs turn out to be oblivious. Though the design of ORAM schemes has been the central focus of oblivious algorithm design, such schemes have a very high computational overhead, not only due to their asymptotic overhead (due to a theoretical lower bound of O(log n) for every access to an array of n entries) but also due to the fact that they can be inefficient in practice [24, 25, 34, 41] and in some cases -insecure [2] .
Another approach to guaranteeing obliviousness is to assume a limited but non-constant amount of memory that can be accessed non-obliviously. While such an assumption may make sense in certain settings (for example, cryptographic coprocessors may provide internal memory protected from the untrusted system), it is unsafe to make in the more common hardware enclave setting due to a wide range of attacks that can infer access patterns to enclave memory itself [9, 23, 26, 36, 37, 39] .
These considerations motivate the need for the design of problem-specific oblivious algorithms that closely approach the efficiency of their non-secure counterparts without the use of generic primitives or reliance on hardware assump- [27] (Alg. A2) O(mn1n2/t) O(t) -Opaque [43] and ObliDB [13] O(n log 2 (n/t)) O(t) restricted to primary-foreign key joins Oblivious Query Processing [5] O(m log 2 m ) O(log m ) additional details required; performance concerns Ours O(m log 2 m ) O(1) - Table 1 : Comparison of approaches for oblivious database joins. n1 and n2 are the input table sizes, n = n1 + n2, m is the output size, m = m + n1 + n2, t is the amount of memory assumed to be oblivious. The time complexities are in terms of the number of database entries and assume use of a bitonic sorter for oblivious sorting (where applicable).
tions. Such algorithms are very similar to circuits in that their control flow is independent of their inputs. This not only provides security against many side-channel attacks (beyond those involving memory accesses), but also makes them very suitable for use in secure multiparty computation where programs with low circuit complexity achieve the best performance [38, 42] . One of the best-known oblivious algorithms are sorting networks such as those proposed by Batcher [7] , which match (up to at most a logarithmic factor) the standard O(n log n) complexity of sorting and are often a critical component in other oblivious algorithms such as ours. Making database operators oblivious does not pose much of algorithmic challenge in most cases since often one can directly apply sorting networks (for instance to select or insert entries). On the other hand, database joins, being among the most algorithmically-complex operators, have proven to be very difficult to make oblivious in the general case. This is due to the fact that one cannot allow any such oblivious algorithm to base its memory accesses on the structure of the input tables (with respect to how many entries from one table match a given entry in the other table). As such, joins have been the prime focus of work on oblivious database operators: prior work is summarized in Table 1 and discussed in detail in § 4.2.
Contributions
We fully describe an oblivious algorithm for database equijoins that achieves O(n log 2 n+m log m) running time, where n is the input length (the size of both tables) and m is the output length, thus matching the running time of the standard non-oblivious sort-merge join up to a logarithmic factor. It can also achieve a running time of O(n log n + m log m) but only using a sorting network that is too slow in practice. Our algorithm does not use ORAM or any other computationally-expensive primitives and it does not make any hardware assumptions other than the requirement of a constant-size working set of memory (on the order of the size of one database entry), for example to compare two entries. In other words, any model of computation that can support a sorting network on encrypted data can also support our algorithm; this includes secure coprocessors or hardware enclaves like Intel SGX, in which case we provide resistance against various side-channel attacks. In addition, because our program is analogous to a circuit, it is very suitable for use in settings like secure multiparty computation and fully homomorphic encryption.
Our approach is conceptually very simple (we have a working prototype consisting of just 600 lines of C++ code), be-ing based on a few repeated runs of a sorting network and other basic primitives. As such it is both incredibly efficient, amenable to a certain degree of parallelization, and fairly easy to verify for obliviousness. We have used a dedicated type system to verify obliviousness of the prototype implementation itself and have conducted experiments that empirically examine its memory accesses and runtime.
Outline
We begin by providing, in § 2, a brief background on several different modes of computation that our algorithm is compatible with. In § 3, we discuss the goals, challenges, and methodologies related to oblivious algorithm design. § 4 describes the target problem and prior related work, as well as give the intuition behind our approach. The full algorithm is then described in detail in § 5. Finally, we discuss our implementation in § 6, where we also analyze its security and performance.
COMPUTATION ON ENCRYPTED DATA
Users who have securely stored their data on a remote server often need to perform computation on their encrypted data, for example, to execute database queries. We discuss and contrast several different approaches that strive to achieve this purpose.
Outsourced External Memory
In this setting (discussed in [22] ), there is no support for server-side computation on the client's private data. The client treats the server as external memory: if they wish to compute on their data, they must do so locally. This scenario is clearly impractical for intensive computations due to the significant differences between RAM and network latency.
Secure Cryptographic Coprocessors
A cryptographic coprocessor (e.g., [6] ) is a tamper-proof device can perform computation within its own trusted region isolated from its external host. Through the use of remote attestation, the client can send a trusted code base (TCB) to the coprocessor and have it execute within a secure environment shielded from the semi-trusted server (according to the Trusted Platform Module specification [1] ). The drawback to this approach is that such hardware provides very limited memory and computational power, and imposes hardware requirements on the server.
Trusted Execution Environments (TEE)
Hardware enclaves such as Intel SGX [10] , provide similar guarantees to coprocessors in that the client can make use of remote attestation to run a TCB within a trusted execution environment (TEE) that provides guarantees for authenticity and some protection against an untrusted OS. Such designs are becoming increasingly prevalent in new processors, taking the form of a specialized set of instructions for setup and access to the TEE. The enclave provides a limited amount of memory called the Enclave Page Cache (EPC), which resides on the system's main memory but cannot be accessed by other process (including the kernel). In addition, the contents of the enclave are encrypted, and the processor can transparently read, write and perform logical and arithmetic operations on this data. Although these properties make it seem that hardware enclaves provide a secure container completely isolated from the untrusted OS, numerous papers [9, 23, 26, 36, 37, 39] have shown that enclaves like Intel SGX are susceptible to numerous side-channel attacks, e.g., cache attacks that infer data-dependent information based on memory access patterns to enclave memory.
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)
In the general setting, secure multiparty computation [17] allows several parties to jointly compute functionalities on their secret inputs without revealing anything more about their inputs than what can be inferred from the output. The two standard approaches are Yao's garbled circuit protocol [40] , and the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson protocol [18] , based on secret sharing. Both approaches require the desired functionality to be expressed as a boolean circuit, and the output is computed gate by gate. Practical implementations of SMC include the SCALE-MAMBA system [4] , as well as the ObliVM framework [29] , which allows programs to be written in a (restricted) high-level syntax that can then be compiled to a circuit. Outsourcing computation using SMC is usually done using a distributed protocol involving a cluster of several servers [8] .
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
Cryptosystems such as that of Gentry et al. [14] allow arbitrary computation on encrypted data. As in SMC, such schemes require the target computation to be represented as a boolean circuit. Although FHE provides solid theoretical guarantees and several implementations already exist, it is currently too computationally-expensive for practical use.
OBLIVIOUS PROGRAMS
Intuitively, a program is data-oblivious (or simply oblivious) if its control flow, in terms of the memory accesses it makes, is independent of its input given the input size. That is, for all inputs of the same length, the sequence of memory accesses made by an oblivious program is always identical (or identically distributed if the program is probabilistic). This is indeed well-defined for simple computational models like random-access machines and Turing machines; for instance, the latter is said to be oblivious if the motions of its head are independent of its input. However, we need to carefully account for real-world hardware where there can be different types of memory as well as various side-channels unaccounted for in simpler models.
Property/Setting I II III
Local memory
t, pd, pc, c, b t, pc, c, b Secure Computation n/a n/a FHE n/a n/a Table 2 : Properties of three levels of obliviousness. Bottom portion of table shows vulnerability of programs satisfying these levels to timing (t), page access attacks on data (pd ), page access attacks on code (pc) cache-timing (c), or branching (b) attacks when used in different settings.
In the remainder of this section, we define our adversarial model, and introduce three different levels of obliviousness that one can obtain against such an adversary. We also introduce various tools and methodologies related to obliviousness.
Adverserial Model
We will use an abstract random access machine model of computation where we distinguish between two types of memory. During an execution of a program, the adversary has complete view and control of the public memory used throughout its execution. However, the program may use a small amount of local memory (or protected memory) that is completely hidden from the adversary (for example, processor registers). The program may use this memory to perform computations on small chunks of data; the adversary learns nothing about such computations except the time spent performing them (we assume that all processor instructions involving local memory that are of the same type take an equal amount of time).
We assume that the adversary cannot infer anything about the individual contents of individual cells of public memory, as well as whether the contents of a cell match a previous value. This can be achieved through the use of a probabilistic encryption scheme and is not the concern of this paper.
Degrees of Obliviousness
We distinguish between three different levels of obliviousness that a given program may satisfy (summarized in Table  2 ), from weakest to strongest, each subsuming the lower levels. The distinctions will be based on how much local memory the program assumes and whether the program's use of local memory leaks information through side-channels. We will restrict our attention to deterministic programs; the concepts easily generalize to the probabilistic case.
Level I
A program is oblivious in this sense if its accesses to public memory are oblivious but it requires a non-constant amount (ω(1) with regards to the input size) of local memory used for non-oblivious computation (though the amount of local memory is still assumed to be relatively small compared to to the amount of public memory since otherwise we would always use only local memory). This memory may be accessed whenever required and for any duration of time. Such programs are suitable for use in the outsourced external mem-ory model since the client can use as much local memory as there is memory on his machine. They may also be suitable for use in a secure coprocessor model setting since coprocessors have an internal memory separated from the rest of the system. However, in both of these scenarios, timing attacks may be an issue: e.g., if the local memory is used for variable lengths of time between pairs of public accesses.
Examples of algorithms that are oblivious in this sense are those proposed by Goodrich [12, 20, 22] , which are well-suited for the outsourced external memory model.
Level II
At this level we require, as above, accesses to public memory to be oblivious (possibly leaking the output length), but we also require that the program use a constant amount of local memory. In practice, this means that the program can only access RAM obliviously but may use the registers and cache of the processor to perform a series of plaintext computations, for example, to compute the condition for a branch or to perform an arithmetic operation on two words read (obliviously) from memory. If the program needs to perform operations on data that is too large to fit within the processor's registers and cache, the data is split up into word-sized chunks and a sequence of operations is performed on all of the chunks (to maintain obliviousness).
Making the distinction between this level and the previous is motivated by the fact that hardware enclaves like Intel SGX are vulnerable to side-channel attacks based on page-level accesses patterns to enclave memory itself [36, 39] , which have been shown to be extremely powerful, often succeeding in extracting sensitive data and even whole files. Therefore one cannot assume that the Enclave Page Cache provides oblivious memory. In papers like Oblix [30] level II programs are called doubly-oblivious since, in the hardware enclave context, their accesses to both regular and enclave memory are oblivious.
Although it may seem that a level II program is safe against the above attacks, this is not quite the case, though it certainly fares better in this respect than a level I program. The data of the program will be accessed obliviously, but its actual machine code, which is stored in memory, will be accessed based on the control flow of the program. The program may branch in a data-dependent way and though the memory accesses to public data in both branches are required to be the same, each branch will access a different fragment of the program's machine code, thus leaking information about the data that was branched on.
Level III
This is a strong notion of obliviousness where we require that the control flow of the program, down to the level of the exact processor instructions it executes, be completely independent of its input, except possibly its length. In other words, the program counter has to always goes through the same sequence of values for all inputs of the same length. We can think of such a program as a family of circuits, one for each input size; as such, it is very well-suited for secure multiparty computation (and fully homomorphic encryption).
This definition is also motivated by the fact that additional measures are required to provide protection against attacks based on accesses to machine code as well as the fact that hardware enclaves have also been shown to be vulnerable to a variety of other side-channel attacks such as cache-timing [9, 23, 37] , branching [26] , or other types of timing attacks. Such attacks can infer data based on the control flow of a program at the instruction level: this includes the way it accesses the registers and cache of the processor, as well as the exact number of instructions it performs. A level III program will be secure against these attacks so long as care is taken to prevent the compiler from introducing datadependent optimizations.
Revealing Output Length
By producing an output of length m, a program reveals data-dependent information about the input. We can always eliminate this problem by padding the output to its maximum possible size; however, this can result in suboptimal running time. For instance, the join operator can produce an output of up to O(n 2 ) on an input of size n, which means that any join algorithm that pads its output must have at least quadratic runtime. For this reason, we will only consider programs that do not pad their output and thus leak the size of m.
Oblivious RAM (ORAM)
The most general approach to making arbitrary programs oblivious (in any of the above senses) is to use an Oblivious RAM (ORAM), a primitive first introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [16, 19] . An ORAM simulates a regular RAM in such a way that its apparent physical memory accesses are independent of those being simulated, thus providing a general approach to compiling general programs to oblivious ones. In other words, by using an ORAM as an interface through which we store and access sensitive data, we can eliminate access pattern leaks, though in doing so we incur at least a logarithmic overhead per memory access according to the Goldreich-Ostrovsky lower bound [19] . Even if such overhead is acceptable in terms of the overall asymptotic complexity, ORAM constructions tend to have prohibitively large constant overhead, which make them impractical to use on reasonably-sized inputs.
One of the well-known ORAM schemes is Path ORAM [35] , which produces programs that satisfy level I obliviousness (Oblix [30] gives a modification that is oblivious at level II). Various schemes have been introduced that make ORAM more suitable for SMC by optimizing its resulting circuit complexity (i.e., how close it is to producing a level III program) [11, 15, 38, 42] . Despite the abundance of ORAM schemes, their high performance cost [24, 25, 34, 41] (due to their polylogarithmic complexity overhead, their large hidden constants, and issues with parallelizability), calls for a need for problem-specific oblivious algorithm design.
From Oblivious Programs to Circuits
Given a program that satisfies level II obliviousness, approaches exist to transform it into a a circuit-like level III program while introducing only a constant overhead [28, 29, 31, 33] . There are three additional constrains that the control flow of the program must satisfy for this to be the case:
1. Any loop condition must depend on either a constant or the input size. This corresponds to the fact that all loops must be unrolled if one wishes to obtain a literal boolean circuit. For instance if secret is a variable that depends on the contents of the input data, we cannot allow behaviour like:
Though this code will make no memory accesses if the i counter is stored in a register, it is very hard to automatically protect such code against timing attacks in general (though in this case the fix is obvious: replace the while loop with i ← secret).
2. The branching depth of the program -the maximum number of conditional branches encountered by any given run -is constant. This requirement allows us to eliminate conditional statements without affecting runtime complex-
can be replaced by
This increases the total computation by a factor of 2. On the other hand, if we have a sequence of d nested conditional statements, the computational overhead will be on the order of 2 d , which is why we require d to be constant.
3. If the program reveals the output length m, it does so only after allocating m0 ∈ Ω(m) memory. This is so the level II program can be split into two circuit-like level III programs that are to be run in sequence: one parameterized by n that computes the value of m0, and a second parameterized by both n and m0.
Oblivious Sorting
Sorting networks such as bitonic sorters [7] provide an inplace input-independent way to sort n elements in O(n log 2 n) time, taking the form of an O(log 2 n)-depth circuit. Although O(n log n) constructions also exist, they are either very inefficient in practice (due to large constant overheads) or non-parallelizable [21] . Each non-recursive step of a bitonic sorter reads two elements at fixed input-independent locations, runs a comparison procedure between the two elements and swaps the entries depending on the result. To ensure obliviousness, even if the elements are not to be swapped, the same (re-encrypted) entries are written to their original locations. When a probabilistic encryption scheme is used, this leaks no information about whether the two elements were swapped.
We parameterize our calls to a bitonic sorter with a lexicographic ordering on chosen element attributes. For example, if A is a list of elements where each element has attributes x, y, z, . . ., then
will sort the elements in A by increasing x attribute, followed by increasing y attribute, and then by decreasing z attribute.
We can use sorting networks as filters. For instance, we will use ∅ to designate a void (null) entry that is marked to be discarded (or often a "dummy" entry) so that if we know that A of size n has k non-null elements, we can run
and collect the first k non-null elements in the output. Alternatively, Goodrich [20] has proposed an efficient O(n log n) oblivious algorithm specifically for this problem (there referred to as compaction).
PROBLEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we describe the general problem, the security goals our solution will satisfy, and prior work in similar directions. We then briefly outline the general idea behind our approach.
Problem Definition
We are given as input two unsorted tables and are interested in computing the equi-join of both tables (though the ideas extend to more general types of inner joins). That is, our input consists of two tables T1 and T2, each consisting of respectively n1 and n2 (possibly-repeated) pairs (j, d) (we call j a join attribute and d a data attribute). The output we would like to compute is
The tables T1, T2, and T1
T2 are not assumed to be ordered, though in our case the output will be sorted lexicographically, by (j, d).
Related Work
The design of oblivious join operators has been studied both in isolation and also as part of larger privacy-oriented database systems, where it is emphasized as the most challenging component; we compare several different approaches in Table 1 . Agrawal et al. [3] propose several join algorithms for use in a setting similar to ours; however, their roughly O(n1n2) complexity is close to that of a trivial O(n1n2 log 2 (n1n1)) oblivious algorithm based on a nested loop join. Additionally, their security definition allows leakage of a certain property of the inputs (as pointed out in [27] , where the issue was fixed without significant improvements in runtime). SMCQL [8] is capable of processing SQL queries through secure computation primitives but its secure join also runs in O(n1n2) time.
Opaque, which is geared towards private database queries in a distributed setting, implements an oblivious sort-merge algorithm [43] (as well as its variant in ObliDB [13] ) but handles only the specific case of primary-foreign key joins (in which case m = O(n) and their O(n log 2 (n/t)) complexity matches ours for constant t). Though Opaque makes use of the O(t) available enclave memory to optimize its running time, such optimizations rely on "enclave designs that protect against access patterns to the EPC" such as "Sanctum, GhostRider, and T-SGX" to obtain a pool of oblivious memory (meaning that the optimized versions are only level I oblivious). Such constructions could potentially introduce an computational overhead that outweigh any optimizations (GhostRider for instance relies on ORAM) or introduce additional hardware requirements and security assumptions.
The closest to our work is that of Arasu et al. [5] , which mirrors the overall structure of our algorithm but ultimately reduces to a different (arguably more challenging) problem than the one we deal with ("obliviously reordering [sequences] to make [them] barely prefix heavy"). The details for the proposed solution to this problem are incomplete and the authors have not provided a proof-of-concept implementation that shows empirical results. We believe that even if a solution to this problem exists, the overall algorithm will be less efficient than ours due to the high constant overheads from repeated sorts. Lastly, their approach also assumes a local memory of O(log(m + n)) entries (thus being level I oblivious) since it is intended for use in a secure coprocessor setting. For use in the more practical settings like Intel SGX, such memory would either have to be obtained in the same manner as was argued above for the case of Opaque or through an O(log(m + n)) time complexity overhead for each local memory access (that is, if each access achieves obliviousness by reading all entries in local memory).
Encrypted databases like CryptDB [32] employ deterministic and partial homomorphic encryption to process databases in a hardware-independent way but such databases are nonoblivious.
Security Characteristics
Intuitively, our algorithm will be oblivious with regards to the way it accesses any memory with non-constant size. More precisely, we will provide security in the form of level II obliviousness, as described in § 3.2. Hence, our condition will be that for all inputs of length n that produce outputs of equal length m, the sequence of memory accesses our algorithm makes on each the inputs is always the same (or identically distributed if we make use of randomness).
We will use a constant amount of local memory on the order of the size of a single database entry, which we will use to process entries and keep counters. That is, our accesses to public memory (where the the input, output and intermediate tables are stored) will be of the form
The notation e ← T [i] explicitly signifies that the i-th entry of the table T , which is stored in public memory, is read into the variable e stored in local memory. Our code will be such that the memory trace consisting of all ← operations (distinguished by whether they read or write to public memory), are independent of the input sizes n1 and n2, and the output size m.
As argued in § 3.4, a level II program can easily be transformed to a level III program with constant computational overhead as long as no loop conditions depend on the input and the branching depth is constant. Our approach will satisfy these properties and thus yield a program that is secure against many of the side-channel attacks listed in § 3.2.
Overview of Approach
If j1, . . . , jt are the unique join attributes appearing at least once in each table, then T1 T2 can be written as the union of t partitions: Figure 1 : Main idea of the algorithm: The input tables T1 and T2 are expanded to produce S1 and S2, and S2 is aligned to S1.
Each partition (henceforth referred to as group) corresponds to a Cartesian product on sets of size α1(ji) = |{(ji,d1)∈ T1}| and α2(ji) = |{(ji,d2)∈ T2}|, respectively, which we call the dimensions of the group. Each entry (ji, d1) ∈ T1, needs to be matched with α2(ji) elements in T2; similarly each element (ji, d2) ∈ T2 needs to be matched with α1(ji) elements in T1. To this end, and in similar vein to the work of Arasu et al. [5] , we form two expanded tables S1 and S2 (this terminology is borrowed from their paper), each of size m = |T1 T2|, such that there are α2(ji) copies in S1 of each element (ji, d1) ∈ T1 and α1(ji) copies in S2 of each element (ji, d2) ∈ T2. Once the expanded tables are obtained, it only remains to reorder S2 to align with S1 so that each copy of (ji, d2) ∈ T2 appears at indices in S2 that align with each of its α1(ji) matching elements from T1. At this point, obtaining the final output is simply a matter of iterating through both tables simultaneously and collecting the d1 and d2 values from each pair of rows (see Figure 1 ).
The approach we use to obtain the expanded tables is very simple, relying on an oblivious primitive that sends elements to specified distinct indices in a destination array. Namely, to expand a table T to S we will first obliviously distribute each entry of T to the index in S where it ought to first occur; this is achieved by sorting the entries in T by their destination index and then performing O(m log m) data-independent swaps so that the entries "trickle down" to their assigned indices. To complete the expansion, we then perform a single linear pass through the resulting array to duplicate each non-null entry to the empty slots (containing null entries) that succeed it.
ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
The complete algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 1, and its subprocedures are described in the following subsections. We use the notation T (a1, . . . , a l ) when we want to explicitly list the attributes a1, . . . , an of table T , for clarity.
We first call Augment-Tables to augment each of the input tables with attributes α1 and α2 corresponding to Algorithm 1 The full oblivious join algorithm 1: function Oblivious-Join(T1(j, d), T2(j, d)) 2: T1, T2(j, d, α1, α2) ← Augment- Tables(T1, T2 ) 3: S1(j, d, α1, α2) ← Oblivious-Expand(T1, α2) 4:
S2(j, d, α1, α2) ← Oblivious-Expand(T2, α1) 5:
S2 ← Align- Table(S2)  6: initialize TD(d1, d2) of size |S1| = |S2| = m 7:
for i ← 1 . . . m do 8:
return TD group dimensions: this process is described in § 5.1. Then, as detailed in § 5.3, we obliviously expand T1 and T2 into two tables S1 and S2 of size m each: namely, S1 will consist of α2 (contiguous) copies of each entry (j, d1, α1, α2) ∈ T 1, and likewise S2 will consist of α1 copies of each entry (j, d1, α1, α2) ∈ T 2. To achieve this, we rely on the oblivious primitive, Oblivious-Distribute, which is the focus of § 5.2. After expanding both tables, we call Align- Table  to align S2 with S1 (with the help of the α1 and α2 values stored in S2): this amounts to properly ordering S2, as described in § 5.4. Finally, we collect the d values from matching rows in S1 and S2 to obtain the output table TD.
Obtaining Group Dimensions
Before we expand the two input tables, we need to augment them with the α1(ji) and α2(ji) values corresponding to each join attribute ji, storing these in each entry that matches ji (Algorithm 2). To this end, we need to group all entries with common join attributes together into contiguous blocks, further grouping by them by their table ID. This is achieved by concatenating both tables (augmented with table IDs) together and sorting the result lexicographically by (j, tid), thus obtaining a table TC of size n = n1 + n2.
Algorithm 2 Augment the tables T1 and T2 with the dimensions α1 and α2 of each entry's corresponding group. The resulting tables are sorted lexicographically by (j, d). n1 = |T1|, n2 = |T2|, n = n1 + n2. Augment-Tables(T1, T2) O(n log 2 n) 2:
1: function
TC (j, d, tid) ← (T1 × {tid = 1}) ∪ (T2 × {tid = 2}) 3:
TC ← Bitonic-Sort j ↑, tid ↑ (TC ) 4:
TC (j, d, tid, α1, α2 ) ← Fill-Dimensions(TC ) 5:
return T1, T2 9: 10: function Fill-Dimensions(TC ) O(n) 11:
c ← 0 12:
pe ← dummy entry with j = tid = ∞ 13:
for i ← 1 . . . n do 14:
e ← TC [i] 15:
if e.tid = 1 and e.j = pe.j then 16:
c ← 1 17:
e.α1 ← c 18:
else if e.tid = 1 and e.j = pe.j then 19:
c ← c + 1 20:
e.α1 ← c 21:
else if e.tid = 2 and e.j = pe.j then 22:
c ← 1 23:
e.α1 ← 0 24:
e.α2 ← c 25:
else if e.tid = 2 and e.j = pe.j then 26:
c ← c + 1 if pe.tid = 2, 1 otherwise 27:
e.α1 ← pe.α1 28:
e.α2 ← c 29:
pe ← e 30:
TC [i] ← e 31:
pe ← dummy entry with j = tid = ∞ 32:
for i ← n . . . 1 do 33:
e ← TC [i] 34:
if e.tid = 1 and e.j = pe.j then 35:
e.α2 ← 0 36:
else if e.tid = 1 and e.j = pe.j then 37:
e.α1 ← pe.α1 38:
e.α2 ← pe.α2 39:
else if e.tid = 2 and e.j = pe.j then 40:
e.α2 ← pe.α2 41:
pe ← e 42:
TC [i] ← e 43:
return TC
The α1 and α2 values for each group can then be obtained by counting the number of entries originating from table 1 and table 2, respectively. Since such entries appear in contiguous blocks after the sort, this is a matter of keeping count of all entries with the same ID and storing these counts within all entries of the same group; in this manner, we can compute all α1 and α2 values in two linear passes through T (one forward and one backward), as detailed in Fill-Dimensions and shown in Figure 2 .
Take for example the join attribute x, which corresponds to a group with dimensions α1 = 2 and α2 = 3 (since these are the number of entries with ID 1 and 2, respectively). While encountering entries with j = x and tid = 1 during the forward pass, we temporarily store in the α1 attribute of each entry the running count of all previously encountered entries with j = x. When we reach entries with tid = 2, we can propagate the final count α1 = 2 to all these entries, while starting a new running count, stored in α2. After iterating through the whole table TC in this manner, TC holds corrects α1 and α2 values in each "boundary" entry (the last entry within a group, such as (x, u3, . . .)), which can then be propagated to all remaining entries within the same group by iterating through TC backwards. It remains for us to extract the augmented T1 and T2 from TC : to accomplish this, we re-sort TC lexicographically by (tid, j, d): the first n1 values of TC then correspond to T1 (augmented and sorted lexicographically by (j, d) ) , the remaining n2 values correspond to T2.
Oblivious Distribution
We will reduce expansion to a slightly generalized version of the following problem: given an input X = (x1, . . . , xn) of n elements each indexed by an injective map f : X → {1, . . . , m} where m ≥ n, the goal of Oblivious-Distribute (as visualized in Figure 3 ) is to store element xi at index f (xi) of an array A of size m. Note that for m = n, the problem is equivalent to that of sorting obliviously; however for m > n, we cannot directly use a sorting network since the output A needs to contain m − n elements that are not part of the output (such as placeholder ∅ values), and we do not know what indices to assign to such elements so that the xi appear at their target locations after sorting.
One approach to this problem is probabilistic and requires us to first compute a pseudorandom permutation π of size m. We scan through the n elements, storing element xi at index π(f (xi)) of A. We then use a bitonic sorter to sort the m elements of A by increasing values of π −1 applied to each element's index in A. This has the effect of "undoing" the masking effect of the permutation π so that if xi is stored at index π(f (xi)) of A, then as soon as A is sorted, it will appear in its correct destination at index f (xi) of A. An adversary observing the accesses of this procedure observes writes at locations π(f (x1)), . . . , π(f (xn)) of A, followed by the input-independent accesses of the bitonic sorter. Since f is injective, f (x1), . . . , f (xn) are distinct and so the val-Algorithm 3 Obliviously map each x ∈ X to index f (x) of an array of size m ≥ n, where f : X → {1 . . . m} is injective.
1: function Oblivious-Distribute(X, f, m)
2:
A[1 . . . n] ← X 3:
Bitonic-Sort f ↑ (A) O(n log 2 n) 4:
A[n + 1 . . . m] ← ∅ values 5:
extend f tof such thatf (∅) = 0 6: j ← 2 log 2 m 7:
iff (y) ≥ i + j then 12:
A[i] ← y 13:
A[i + j] ← y 14:
else 15:
A[i] ← y 16:
ues π(f (x1)), . . . , π(f (xn)) will correspond to a uniformlyrandom n-sized subset of {1, . . . , m}. This approach is therefore oblivious in the probabilistic sense. The second approach, which we use in our implementation and outlined in Algorithm 3, is deterministic and does not require the use of a pseudorandom permutation, which can be expensive in practice and also introduces an extra cryptographic assumption. It makes the whole algorithm deterministic (making it easy to empirically test for obliviousness) and The idea is to first sort the xi by increasing destination indices according to f (by using the notation Bitonic-Sort f (A), we assume that the f value of each element is stored as an attribute). Each element can then be sent to its destination index by a series of O(log m) hops, where each hop corresponds to an interval j that is a power of two. For decreasing values of j, we iterate through A backwards and perform reads and writes to elements j apart. Most of these will be dummy accesses producing no effect; however, if we encounter an xi such that xi can hop down a distance of j and not exceed its target index, we perform an actual swap with the element stored at that location. This will always be a ∅ element since the non-null elements ahead of xi make faster progress, as we will formally show. Therefore each xi will make progress at the values of j that correspond to its binary expansion, and it will never be the case that it regresses backwards by virtue of being swapped with a non-null element that precedes it in A.
In Figure 3 , for example, each element must move a distance that for m = 8, has a binary expansion involving the numbers 4, 2 and 1. No xi can make a hop of length 4 in this example; however, for the next hop length, 2, element x4 will advance to index 7, after which element x5 will advance to index 6 (which at this point corresponds to an empty cell containing a ∅ value). Finally, for a hop length of 1, element x4 will advance to index 8, element x1 will advance to index 4 and element x3 will advance to index 3, in that order; at this point all the elements will be stored at their desired locations.
We deal with correctness in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. If m > n and f : {x1, . . . , xn} → {1, . . . , m} is injective, then Oblivious-distribute(X, f, m) returns an A such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, A[f (xi)] = xi (and the remaining elements of A are ∅ values).
Proof. Note that after A is initialized, any write to A is either part of a swap or leaves A unchanged; thus at the end of the procedure, A is a permutation of its initial elements and therefore still contains all the n elements of X and m−n ∅ values. After A is sorted, its first n elements, y1, . . . , yn, are the elements of X sorted by their values under f (their destination indices).
Let k = log 2 m and let Ir(yi) be the index of yi at the end of the r-th outer iteration (for 0 ≤ r ≤ k + 1 with r = 0 corresponding to the state at the start of the loop). We want to show that for all i, I k+1 (yi) = f (yi); this will follow from Equation (3) of the following invariant: at the end of the r-th outer iteration, we have that
for all i < j, and
for all i. For r = 0, (1) holds since I0(yi) = i for all i, (2) and the left inequality of (3) follows from the fact the yi are sorted by their values under f and the fact that f is injective. The right inequality of (3) is simply the bound f (yi)−i ≤ f (yi) ≤ m < 2 k+1 .
Assuming the invariant holds at iteration r, we show that it holds at iteration r + 1 as well. Consider all (non-dummy) swaps that happen at iteration r + 1 between y = yi for some i (y = ∅ sincef (∅) = 0) and some element y at the index Ir(yi) + 2 k−r > Ir(yi) (which means that f (yi) ≥ Ir(yi) + 2 k−1 ). It must be the case that y = ∅; for if y = yj for some j < i, then yj must still be at index Ir(yj) < Ir(yi) < Ir(yi) + 2 k−r , and if y = yj for some j > i, then the two facts
imply that f (yj) ≥ Ir(yj) + 2 k−r , which means that yj must have been swapped with the element at Ir(yj) + 2 k−r > Ir(yi) + 2 k−r in a previous iteration of the inner loop. It follows that no two elements yi and yj are ever swapped together, and Ir+1(yi) = Ir(yi) + 2 k−r , Ir(yi) + 2 k−r ≤ f (yi) Ir(yi), otherwise.
That the sequence {Ir+1(yi)}i is strictly increasing follows from the fact that {Ir(yi)}i is strictly increasing and as argued, if Ir+1(yi) = Ir(yi) + 2 k−r ≤ f (yi), then Ir(yj) + 2 k−r ≤ f (yj) for all j > i. We now show that for j > i,
Lastly, we need to show that
which finishes the proof of the invariant.
It then follows from (3) that I k+1 (yi) = f (yi), and so when the k + 1 iterations of the outer loop complete, each yi will appear in its correct index according to f .
Oblivious Expansion
Oblivious-Expand takes an array X = (x1, . . . , xn) and a function g on X which assigns non-negative integer counts to each x, and outputs A = (x1, . . . , x1
g(x 1 ) times , x2, . . . , x2
This can easily be achieved using Oblivious-Distribute (see Figure 4 ) if we assume m ≥ n and g(xi) > 0 for all xi: we compute the cumulative sum f (xi) = 1 + i−1 j=1 xj, and obliviously distribute the xi according to f (in practice, the values of f are stored as attributes in augmented entries). The resulting array A is such that each xi is stored in the first location that it needs to appear in the output of Oblivious-Expand; the next g(xi) − 1 values following xi are all ∅. Thus we only need to iterate through A, storing the last encountered entry and using it to overwrite the ∅ entries that follow.
To account for the possibility that g(xi) = 0 for certain xi (which means that m may possibly be less than n), we simply need to modify Oblivious-Distribute to take as input an n-sized array X such that the subset X of X of entries not marked as ∅ has size n ≤ m and f : X → {1 . . . m} is injective. The output will be an Algorithm 4 Obliviously duplicate each x ∈ X g(x) times.
1: function Oblivious-Expand(X, g) 2:
obtain f values and distribute according to f 3:
s ← 1 4:
for i ← 1 . . . n do O(n) 5:
x ← X[i] 6:
if g(x) = 0 then 7: mark x as ∅ 8:
else 9:
set f (x) = s 10:
s ← s + g(x) 11:
A ← Ext-Oblivious-Distribute(X, f, s − 1) 13:
fill in missing entries 14:
px ← ∅ 15:
if x = ∅ then 18:
x ← px 19: else 20:
px ← x 21:
A
return A 23: 24: function Ext-Oblivious-Distribute(X, f, m)
25:
A[1 . . . n] ← X 26:
if m ≥ n then 28:
A array A with each xi ∈ X stored at index f (xi) of A; the remainder of A will consist of ∅ values as before. This modified version of Oblivious-Distribute (Ext-Oblivious-Distribute) will allow Oblivious-Expand to mark entries xi with g(xi) = 0 as ∅ (done in practice by first making sure the entries are augmented with an extra flag bit for this purpose) to the effect that they can be discarded by Ext-Oblivious-Distribute, as shown in Algorithm 4.
Table Alignment
Recall that S1 is obtained from T1 based on the counts stored in α2 since for each entry (ji, d1) ∈ T1, α2(ji) is the number of entries in T2 with attribute ji, and these are all the entries that (ji, d1) must be matched with. Likewise S2 is obtained from T2 based on the counts stored in α1. It remains for us to properly align S2 to S1 so that each output entry corresponds to a row of S1 and a row of S2 with matching index. More precisely, we need to sort S2 so that the sequence of pairs {(S1[i].d1, S2[i].d2)} m i=1 is a lexicographic ordering of all the pairs in T1 T2. For example, in Figure 5 , the α2(x) = 2 copies of (x, u1) in S2, need to be matched with α2(x) = 2 entries from T1: (x, a1) and (x, a2).
Since the entries in S1 occur in blocks of size α1(x) = 3, this means that the copies of (x, u1) in S2 need to occur a distance of α1(x) = 3 apart: at indices 1 and 4 in S2.
In general, these indices can be computed from the α1 and α2 attributes, as outlined in Algorithm 5. Note that q is
x 4
x 4 x 5 Figure 4 : Example oblivious expansion. Achieved by obliviously distributing each element to where it should first appear, and then scanning through the resulting array to duplicate each entry in the null slots that follow.
Algorithm 5 Reorder S2 so that its m entries align with those of S1. 1: function Align- Table(S2)  2 :
q ← (0-based) index of e within block for e.j 6:
e.ii ← q/e.α2 + (q mod e.α2) · e.α1 7:
return S2 simply a counter that is reset when a new join attribute is encountered, similarly to the counter c in Algorithm 2.
EVALUATION
We implemented a (sequential) C++ prototype (available at https://git.uwaterloo.ca/skrastni/obliv-join-impl) of the general algorithm that is not bound to any particular hardware setup. The prototype takes as input a plaintext file consisting of two tables specified by (j, d) pairs (of integers), computes the join in the manner described, and outputs the resulting plaintext consisting of (d1, d2) pairs. All contents of (heap-allocated) memory that correspond to public memory -all except a constant number of variables such as counters and those used to store the results of a constant number of read entries -are accessed through a wrapper class which is used to keep a log of such accesses.
We empirically tested the correctness of the implementation by generating a large number of tests (≈ 1,000) corresponding to different values of n (from 10 to 1,000,000), and the wide variety of join groups an input of size n could possibly induce (for instance, n 1 × 1 groups, a single 1 × n group, or groups of different sizes whose widths and heights are drawn from distributions with different parameters). Our implementation produced correct outputs in all the cases.
Security Analysis
We verified the obliviousness of our implementation both formally, through the use of a dedicated type system, and empirically, by comparing the logs of memory accesses for different inputs. 
Verification of Obliviousness through Typing
Liu et al. [28] showed that programming language techniques can be used to verify the obliviousness of programs. The authors formally define the concept of memory trace obliviousness (roughly corresponding to our notion of level III obliviousness), and define a type system in which only programs satisfying this property are well-typed. We adapted a simplified version of their system that does not incorporate the use of ORAM (since we do not use any), and which corresponds to level II obliviousness in accordance with our high-level description in the previous section.
The type system is presented in Figure 6 , in a condensed format. Each type is a pair of the form τ ; T , where τ is either Var l, Array l, or a statement, and T is a corresponding trace. In the case when τ is Var l or Array l, the label l is either L ("low" security) if the variable or array stores input-independent data, or H ("high" security) otherwise. The ordering relation on labels, l1 l2, is satisfied when l1 = l2 = L, or l1 = L and l1 = H. We define l1 l2 to be H if at least one of l1 or l2 is H and L otherwise. In an actual program, we would set to L the label of variables corresponding to the values of n and m, and set to H the label of all allocated arrays that will contain input-dependent data (in our program all arrays are such). The trace T is a sequence of memory accesses R, y, i (reads) or W, y, i (writes), where y is the accessed array and i is the accessed index. We use to denote an empty trace and || to denote the concatenation operator.
All judgements for expressions are of the form
where Γ is an environment mapping variables and arrays to types, exp is an expression and τ is its type, and T is the trace produced when evaluating exp. Judgments for statements are of the form Γ s; T.
Note that all rules that involve reads and writes to only Var types emit no trace since they model our notion of local memory. The rule T-Asgn models the flow of high-security data: a variable x that is the target of an assignment involving an H variable y must always be labeled H. The rules T-Read and T-Write are similar to T-Asgn but also ensure two other properties: that arrays are always indexed by variables labeled L (for otherwise the memory access would leak data-dependent data), and that the reads and writes to arrays emit a trace consisting of the corresponding memory access. The two rules that play an important role in modeling obliviousness are T-Cond, which ensures that the two branches of any conditional statement emit the same memory traces, and T-For, which ensures the number of iterations of any loop is a low-security variable (such as a constant, n, or m).
We manually verified that our implementation is welltyped in this system by annotating the code with the correctly inferred types. For example, every if statement was annotated with the matching trace of its branches.
Experiments: Memory Access Logs
For small n (n ≤ 10), we manually created different test classes (around 5), where each test class corresponds to values of n1 and n2 (summing to n), and an output length m. We verified, by direct comparison, that the memory access logs for each of the inputs in the same class were identical. Figure 7 visualizes the full sequence of memory accesses for n1 = n2 = 4 and m = 8.
For larger values of n where the logs were too large to fit in memory, we kept a hash of the log instead. That is, we Figure 7 : Visualization of our implementation's input-independent pattern of memory access as it joins two tables of size 4 into a table of size 8. Horizontal axis is (discretized) time, vertical axis is the memory index; light shade denotes a read; dark denotes a write.
Subroutine
Approx. # of comparisons initial sort on TC n(log 2 n) 2 /4 second sort on TC n(log 2 n) 2 /4 obliv. expansion of T1 n1(log 2 n1) 2 /4 + m log 2 m obliv. expansion of T2 n2(log 2 n2) 2 /4 + m log 2 m sort on S2 m(log 2 m) 2 /4 total for all subroutines n(log 2 n) 2 + n log 2 n (assuming m ≈ n1 = n2) set H = 0, and for every access to an index i of an array Ar allocated by our program, we updated H as follows:
where h is a cryptographic hash function (SHA-256 in our case) and t is 0 or 1 depending on whether the access is a read or a write to Ar. With n ranging from 20 to 20,000, we programatically generated 14 different test classes, with 50 inputs in each class (generated to represent a diverse range of group dimensions), and verified that the resulting hashes were the same for all inputs in the same class.
Performance Analysis
Taking into account the fact that performing a bitonic sort on input n makes roughly n(log 2 n) 2 /4 comparisons, the cost breakdown of the full algorithm is summarized in Table 3 , which supports the fact that our time complexity of O(n log 2 n + m log m) does not hide large constants that would make the algorithm impractical.
In terms of space usage, the total (non-oblivious, public) memory we use is max(n1, m)+max(n2, m) entries since the table TC has size n1 + n2, the augmented tables T1 and T2 correspond to two regions of TC , and the expanded tables S1 and S2 can be obtained from T1 and T2 by only allocating as many extra entries as needed to expand T1 and T2 to tables of size m (if one of the original tables has size less than m, then no extra entries will be allocated for that table's expansion).
We ran our prototype implementation on a single core of an Intel Core i5-7300U 2.60 GHz laptop with 8 GB RAM; the runtime (both total and that of Oblivious-Distribute) for a selection of input sizes ranging from n = 1, 000 to n = 1, 000, 000 and output sizes roughly equal to n/2 is shown in Figure 8 .
Although our implementation is non-parallel, almost all parts of our algorithm are amenable to parallelization since they heavily rely on sorting networks, whose depth is O(log 2 n). following the sorts in each of the two calls to Oblivious-Distribute. We have not investigated whether these operations can be parallelized in a meaningful way.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our algorithm for oblivious joins has a runtime that closely approaches that of the standard sort-merge join and has a low total operation count. Being based on sorting networks and similar constructions, it has very low circuit complexity and introduces novel data-independent techniques for query processing. There is an increasing demand for such approaches due to their resistance against side-channel attacks and suitability for secure computation.
We have not directly considered whether compound queries involving joins can be optimized using the techniques for this paper. Grouping aggregations over joins could be computed using fewer sorting steps than a full join would require, for example, by combining the work of Arasu et al. [5] in this direction with the primitives we provide. These primitives, especially oblivious distribution and expansion, could also potentially be useful in providing a general framework for oblivious algorithm design or have direct applications in various different problem areas with similar security goals.
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